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Concept formation is a demanding task in social research. A methodological
approach (called LION) is presented that emphasizes the clarification of
concepts based on linguistic and ontological views. This method originates from
a qualitative-pragmatist tradition of studies of work-practices in organizational
settings and it is explicitly based on the linguistic turn and the practice turn in
social research. It is also based on the articulation of seven conceptualization
maxims. Its aim is to bring rigor to the conceptualizing process and clarity to
resulting conceptualizations. The method is illustrated through an analysis
example from service management. The concepts of “value-in-use” and “value
generation” are critically analyzed using linguistically and ontologically
oriented questions. The application of the LION method in qualitative research
is discussed concerning research question formulation, collection, and analysis
of data, review of extant theory, and final articulation of theoretical
contribution.
Keywords: conceptualization, linguistic turn, practice turn, language, ontology,
qualitative research, pragmatism

Introduction
Meanings and Significances of Conceptualization
Conceptual development is essential in research and means the creation and refinement
of concepts that are used to describe the world in theories, frameworks, and other knowledge
products. Concepts are constituents in all kinds of scientific statements. They are constituents
in explanatory, evaluative, normative, and prescriptive statements. Concepts can form
statements of their own kind, as conceptual statements, where concepts are clarified. A
conceptual statement is equivalent to a definition. Concepts are categorial knowledge. A
concept is a categorization of phenomena in the world. A concept is expressed in a common
word, and it refers to some phenomena. Concepts are used to order the world into classes of
phenomena. Members of such a category are considered similar and they share properties that
unify them into a class and at the same time discern and differentiate them from other
phenomena that belong to other conceptual classes.
Conceptualizing is essential in qualitative research. Working with quantitative research
may imply that concepts only from the literature are used to test relations between them, while
no new concepts are created during such a research inquiry. On the contrary, in qualitative
research, the main reason for applying this kind of research is often to “create new concepts”
that give an improved and more nuanced understanding of the world. In the very title of their
ground-breaking book on qualitative research methodology, Glaser and Strauss (1967) declare
their aim and make a programmatic appeal to social researchers to strive for “discovery of
grounded theory.” Although the concept of “discovery” has been contested (as “unfounded and
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naïve” by Bryant, 2002) in the context of theory construction, I do think that “discovery” is
essential for an understanding of conceptualization and qualitative research. The concept of
discovery should be seen in the light of much qualitative research that aims to “detect new”
(not already known) “phenomena” and to “create a new understanding” through “new
concepts” based on in-depth empirical inquiries (Goldkuhl & Cronholm, 2019).
When looking into the meaning of conceptualization, the following two meanings can
be found: (a) the process of forming a conceptual form of a phenomenon, that is, the act of
conceptualizing; (b) the concept so formed, something conceptualized (from Wiktionary.org;
similar definitions can be found in other dictionaries). How come that “conceptualization” can
have these two different meanings in ordinary language? How should we then use this term in
a scientific argumentation that should strive for unambiguousness? I want to provide a possible
explanation to this following the analysis in Goldkuhl (2022). Conceptualization as a word
form is a noun. It is a nominalization, that is, it is made a noun from another word having a
common etymological origin as is the case in polysemy. Conceptualization is a nominalization
of the verb “conceptualize,” which implies that it is a noun denoting a process (meaning a
above). However, it can also be seen as a nominalization of “conceptualized.” In this case, it is
a nominalization of the result from the process of conceptualizing. The word “conceptualized,”
albeit a verb, is here used in the participle form as an attribute in the phrase “something
conceptualized” (meaning b above). This implies a similar meaning as “concept.” What was
accounted for above was also an example of a linguistic analysis of concepts, which is part of
the method for concept formation presented in this paper. It will be further elaborated on below.
In the following, I will use phrases such as concept formation, conceptualization process, or
conceptualizing to denote the process phenomenon (meaning a), and I will use concept or
conceptualization to denote the resulting phenomenon (meaning b).
Purpose
The development of scientific knowledge about the social world includes thus
conceptual development, as an essential part. Proposing and using concepts in scientific
reasoning means talking about the world. This implies a need for a reflective understanding
concerning:
1. The “world” talked about
2. How we “talk” about the world
The first issue can be called “ontological,” that is, what is the fundamental character of
the studied world (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012). The second issue is about “language,” that is,
how concepts are used in linguistic utterances (Suddaby, 2010).
The purpose of this paper is to present an approach to conceptualization that builds on
ontological and linguistic reflections. I call this approach to conceptualization the LION
method that is an abbreviation of LInguistic and ONtological determination. The method is
founded on the goals that conceptualizing should be a “rigorous” process of leading to “clarity”
in evolved conceptualizations. These goals can be transformed into “research questions” for
this paper: How can the conceptualization process be performed in a rigorous way concerning
the language use of concepts and the ontology of world-phenomena? How can
conceptualizations be stated with clarity concerning the language use of concepts and kinds of
phenomena in the studied world? The motivational and conceptual background of this method
is further explored in a coming section below when reviewing extant discourses on
conceptualization in research.
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The LION Method for Concept Formation: An Introduction
I present in this section an overview of the LION method; what parts it consists of. The
method is related to discourses on scientific conceptualization, and I describe how it has
originated. The structure of the method presentation in the paper follows.
Main Parts of the LION Method
As a method for concept formation, LION consists of several related elements. First, it
consists of a “perspectival foundation” expressed as seven conceptualization maxims. Second,
it consists of “conceptual frameworks” concerning the linguistics of conceptualization and a
practice ontology for conceptualization. Third, it consists of a “procedure” for performing
concept formation. The procedure comprises “questions” to ask when conceptualizing.
A Review of Discourses on Conceptualization – Contextualizing the LION Method
Conceptualization is treated explicitly, and implicitly, in a large amount of scientific
literature. In this section, I position the LION method in relation to some relevant discourses
in the literature. In further sections below, I make some specific connections with direct
relations to those treated parts of the method (the conceptualization maxims, and the
frameworks for linguistic and ontological determination).
Conceptualizing and conceptual use pertain to several situations in research practices.
Concepts are important elements in scholars’ pre-understanding that influence how problems
and directions of research are considered (e.g., Blumer, 1969; Fisher & Aguinis, 2017).
Concepts may be guides for the selection of empirical units for inquiry (Welch et al., 2016).
Concepts may be guides for data collection and structuring of data (e.g., Blumer, 1969; Van
Maanen et al., 2007). Concepts may gradually emerge through continual data analysis and
concept refinement (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Fisher & Aguinis, 2017; Gioia et al., 2013; Glaser,
2002; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Concepts are necessary to drive a comparative analysis that
may include data and abstractions (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Fisher & Aguinis, 2017; Glaser,
2002; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Concepts may be searched for among extant theories as an aid
in data analysis and conceptual emergence (e.g., Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Eisenhardt, 1989;
Fisher & Aguinis, 2017; Van Maanen et al., 2007). Concepts are building blocks for the
formulation and validation of theoretical statements (Dubin, 1969; Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser &
Strauss, 1967; Osigweh, 1989; Reynolds, 1971; Welch et al., 2016). Established concepts
provide a common vocabulary for the scholarly community (e.g., Welch et al., 2016). All these
situations of conceptual development and use are acknowledged as significant for a method of
concept formation as LION.
Theorizing comprises often the formulation of abstract concepts. In theorizing, there
may be an attempt to create concepts with broad coverage. Such an abstract and broad concept
may cover many phenomena and sometimes the phenomena lumped together under the label
of a concept are too disparate to make a well-thought concept (Hirsch & Levin, 1999; Locke,
2012). There maybe also be that some conceptual labels are homonymic or polysemous in
character. This means that a concept in one statement means something, and in another
statement, the concept label designates something else, although there might be some
resemblance between them (Podsakoff et al., 2016). There is of course also the case that
synonyms exist (Suddaby, 2010), and in such cases, there might be hard to determine if there
exists an exact equivalence between such different terms. Sometimes, there may be concepts
that are vague and fuzzy. Readers of scientific texts may be very uncertain concerning the
meanings of proposed concepts due to their vague characters. All these conceptual pitfalls and
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challenges put demands on the process of conceptualization. As scholars working with
conceptualizing, we need to address the following questions: How do we avoid unclear and
abstruse formulations? How do we avoid categorial mistakes in definitions? How can we make
our conceptual formulations entrenched in the real-world? How can we create definitions in
sharp and communicative language? It is foundational in a theory development process to
perform conceptualization in a clear and rigorous way. Clarity in conceptualized findings and
developments is necessary to successfully communicate within targeted communities
(Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Suddaby, 2010).
There exist, in the literature, several criteria and guidelines for concept formation (e.g.,
Locke, 2012; Suddaby, 2010). One ambitious approach is presented by Podsakoff et al. (2016).
They have presented a methodologized conceptualization approach consisting of four stages;
two preparatory stages followed by defining the concept and a continual revision. The four
stages are: (a) attribute specification through inquiries in diverse sources, (b) determining what
attributes are necessary and sufficient, (c) formulating a preliminary definition, (d) further
conceptual refinement. The LION method takes another approach and can thus be seen as
complementary to conceptualizing following Podsakoff et al. (2016). Their kind of “life cycle
approach” with different stages is not predominant in LION. Neither is the discussion of
different sources in stage a. I do not deny the importance of such methodological guidelines,
however, the LION method takes a focused approach on concepts while problematizing and
specifying their linguistic and ontological bases. LION takes as its vantage point a concept
proposal (typically from data analysis or extant literature) and continually refines it through
close examinations of how to linguistically express and delimit the concept and how to relate
it ontologically to foundational kinds of phenomena. The LION method also applies seven
conceptualization maxims elaborated in the next section. These maxims strengthen the
linguistic and ontological orientation, which I found missing in Podsakoff et al. (2016). That is
why I state that these two conceptualizing methods should be seen as complementary and not
opposing.
The LION method for concept formation has emerged through experiences from
working in a “qualitative research tradition.” This means that the kinds of concepts that are
elaborated here are typically those that have been developed through a qualitative research
approach. The emergence of this conceptualization approach follows a qualitative tradition
with a pragmatist orientation (Blumer, 1969; Dewey, 1938). It is inspired by philosophical
works within pragmatist traditions (e.g., Dewey & Bentley, 1949; James, 1907; Peirce, 1878;
Thayer, 1981; Wittgenstein, 1958a, 1958b).
The LION method builds on the division into linguistic and ontological issues. In
linguistic issues, especially the relations between concepts and words are addressed. In
ontological issues, especially the relations between concepts and phenomena are addressed.
The linguistic focus in the LION method builds on what has been called the linguistic turn in
science (e.g., Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Bergmann, 1953; Rorty, 2010; Schoeneborn et al.,
2019; Wittgenstein, 1958a, 1958b). The ontological focus in LION builds on what has been
called the practice turn in science (e.g., Miettinen et al., 2009; Schatzki, 1996, 2001; Simpson,
2009; Whittington, 2006). The linguistic turn means a turn to an enhanced understanding of
the role that language plays in scientific development. The practice turn means an ontological
turn to practices as nexuses of social reality and thus how to understand this reality.
Accentuating a linguistic focus is a response to problems and needs as expressed by
Alvesson and Kärreman (2000): “The problem is that, in common with the work of a great
majority of organizational and social researchers, there is a shared oversimplistic understanding
of language and language use” (p. 140). To address this, one needs to explicitly focus on
language and how to use different words. The LION method is founded on the claims to
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enhance reflection, articulation, and rigor in conceptualizing by addressing linguistic aspects
as stated by Alvesson and Kärreman (2000).
As stated by the mentioned practice theorists, a practice is co-constitutive in relation to
its sub-parts. Activities, roles, language, and objects build up a practice, but they are only
considered adequate elements of that practice if they are congruent with the practice’s meaning
and purpose. Practice is both physical and discursive. I have labeled the practice ontology of
the LION method as “socio-instrumental practice.” “Social” means an emphasis on the social
and intersubjective character of work-practices. In practice, human action can be performed
with the aid of linguistic means or physical tools. The word “instrumental” emphasizes that
human actions are conducted in such a mediated way (Wertsch, 1998) using all possible
instruments (linguistic, technical, or simple material tools).
A practice-ontological perspective, as the one presented below, can bring “new ways
of seeing and new questions to ask” (Simpson, 2009, p. 1330). It acknowledges entities of
diverse kinds (e.g., Nicolini, 2012; Schatzki, 1996), but puts them into a relational context of
enactment with “a focus on the everyday activity of organizing in both its routine and
improvised forms” (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011, p. 1240). The presented practice ontology
is harmonious with established qualitative views of social reality, such as social
phenomenology (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) and symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969), but
brings also onto the scene different types of artifacts that play decisive roles in the forming of
modern social life (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Schmidt, 2014).
The Origin and Application Scope of the LION Method
The LION method has emerged during many years of qualitative research work,
including research, teaching, and supervision. Original ideas were presented in Goldkuhl
(2002) and later refined in many publications (e.g., Goldkuhl, 2019; Goldkuhl & Röstlinger,
2003). The development of the LION method has followed an abductive research strategy over
a long time (Kennedy & Thornberg, 2018). It has switched back and forth between research
work containing concept forming, literature reviews, methodological development, and
discussions and interaction within the scholarly community. A recent LION application can be
found in Goldkuhl (2022).
The substantive areas that are the background of this conceptualization approach are
within “organizational, institutional, and professional work-practices.” I have a background in
studying many types of organizational and institutional practices. Examples are manufacturing,
logistics, marketing/purchasing/business interaction, service management, innovation/change
management, consultancy management, information systems management, diverse kinds of
public administration, defense administration, social work, healthcare, and education. This list
is not made to exclude any similar kinds of practice. On the contrary, the aim here has been
towards a generalized and inclusive scope of an application of this conceptualization approach.
I make this declaration of the origin of the LION method for the following reasons.
First, it helps the reader to understand the originating context of practice studies to assess the
method adequately. Second, it informs the reader about its hitherto main areas of application
and thereby helps the reader to judge its potential value in other types of studies. I presume that
this kind of conceptualization approach also might be useful in (a) other types of qualitative
research than practice-oriented studies and (b) quantitative research endeavors. It is evident
that both qualitative and quantitative research needs concepts that are linguistically and
ontologically well-reflected.
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Presentation of LION
The general background of LION is presented above in the introduction (the main
scope, definitions, and main purpose of the method). The LION foundation is further elaborated
above in the sections of the method introduction (the main parts of the method, its relations to
relevant discourses in the literature, method origin, and application scope). In the next section,
the seven foundational conceptualization maxims of LION are presented. Then, in two sections,
the two main parts of LION (linguistic and ontological determination) are presented. After that,
it follows a synthesis of linguistic and ontological determination, how the seven maxims are
applied in a LION analysis, and a clarification of the method procedure (its different analytical
questions). The following section is an example of a LION concept analysis (value creation in
service logic). Next, it follows a discussion on how LION can be used in different situations of
qualitative research. In the last section, concluding remarks are formulated.
LION: Seven Foundational Conceptualization Maxims
As a foundation for the linguistic and ontological approach to conceptualization, I
elaborate on seven conceptualization maxims based on prominent literature. The maxims are
described below and summarized in Table 1. I refer in the text below to the seven maxims by
their numbers (#1-#7) in Table 1. These maxims express certain essentials of conceptualization
as process and result. I have extracted knowledge from philosophical and methodological
literature and formulated such knowledge concerning conceptualization in a succinct way in
these maxims. The maxims as such can stand alone as a useful contribution to conceptualization
work. In this paper, they are, however, considered an integral and foundational part of the LION
method.
When working with conceptual development, it is essential to keep in mind the semiotic
triadic relationship between word, concept, and phenomenon (Ogden & Richards, 1923).
Words are symbolic expressions that stand for concepts. Concepts are what is thought of, and
they are part of humans’ intersubjective sphere of understanding life. Words and concepts refer
to a world of phenomena thought of and spoken about. This world can be external to humans,
but phenomena can also be elements of the inner world of humans. Through words and
concepts, we can refer to subjective phenomena like thoughts, intentions, experiences, and
feelings.
One basic insight from the semiotic triad is that conceptualizing comprises reflection
about the use and meanings of categories as thought constructs and how such categories are
expressed in suitable words and what kind of phenomenon in the world a category refers to.
Working with conceptualization means dealing, in an integrated way, with linguistic issues
(proper words as expressions) and ontological issues (phenomena as referents). This means to
move back and forth between words - concepts – phenomena (#1). This means that when the
focus is on one of these three, the other two should be in the contextual background but not
totally disregarded. “Phenomena” addressed in research inquiries are “categorized” and
“linguistically codified” phenomena.
Confusion about what a word/concept means in a discourse is often due to vagueness
in how specific words are used. A word has a potential meaning repertoire, and a specific word
can take different meaning roles in different utterances. Misunderstandings may arise due to
the meanings of words are unspecified. Wittgenstein (1958a) emphasized meaning as language
use. This means that specific words in utterances get their meaning from how they are used.
We must decide what we shall mean by a stated expression (#2). One way to do this is through
clear references to practical consequences of what it should mean to adhere to an asserted
conceptual distinction. Peirce (1878) elaborated on this in his classic article “How to make our
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ideas clear” where he stated, “we come down to what is tangible and conceivably practical, as
the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtle it may be; and there is no
distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice”
(#3). James (1907) brought this further with direct references to decisions on how to use
linguistic expressions in communication, that is, meaning as “decided language use” (#2).
James further elaborated on the consequences of this practical attitude:
There can be no difference anywhere that doesn’t make a difference elsewhere-no difference in abstract truth that doesn’t express itself in a difference in
concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody,
somehow, somewhere and somewhen. (James, 1907)
Phenomena, conceptualized, and referred to, must exist somewhere and/or in some way
(#4). This claim to existence should not be misinterpreted as a claim to only external-physical
existence. As said, conceptualized phenomena can be of a subjective nature, such as thoughts,
intentions, experiences, and feelings.
Phenomena in the social world should not be seen as isolated objects. The social world
is a relational world (Emirbayer, 1997). It consists of objects that can be distinguished as
separate although having relationships with other objects (#5). Phenomena appear always
together with other phenomena in situations (Dewey, 1938). The environment is external to
humans, but it is fundamentally relational. Different environmental objects, which can be of
different kinds (natural, physically human-made, symbolic), afford different kinds of action
possibilities for humans (Gibson, 1979). Human-made objects (of physical or symbolic
character) have of course relationships with their creators as well as their recipients and users.
This kind of “relationality” is also reflected in the way we use language describing the world
(#5). In most utterances, the locutor positions different phenomena, through syntactic and
semantic roles, to each other. “Words, concepts, and symbols derive their meaning only from
their location within concrete utterances” (Emirbayer, 1997, p. 301). This kind of relational
thinking also positions processes and actions as central to the conception of social life. It avoids
structuralist and substantialist thinking where a separate phenomenon (an independent
variable) by itself produces effects on another phenomenon (a dependent variable), without any
explicit processual transformation (Abbott, 1992; Dewey & Bentley, 1949; Emirbayer, 1997).
Blumer (1969, p. 71) has formulated a strong action dictum for the study of social life: “the
essence of society lies in an ongoing process of action - not in a posited structure of relations.
Without action, any structure of relations between people is meaningless. To be understood, a
society must be seen and grasped in terms of the action that comprises it” (#6). This means that
processes and related concepts, such as actions, activities, operations, and events, must have
prominent places in the conceptualization of social reality (Rescher, 1996; Weick, 1979). From
this follows also that scholars need to be cautious concerning which verbs and how verbs
(process concepts) are used in conceptualizations and theoretical statements. In many
abstractions, there seem to be short-cut descriptions where processes and actions have
disappeared or are made implicit (Abbott, 1992; Emirbayer, 1997).
It is important to avoid a diffuse abstractedness in the concepts formulated. Concepts
need to be properly demarcated and there should be clear what is covered by a specific concept
and what is not. The link between abstract concepts and empirical phenomena should not be
broken. Concepts should be clearly anchored to the world described. This means that the
conceptualization process should be conducted with clear links to the empirical world studied
and talked about. We should introduce conceptual abstractions in a way that keeps the link to
empirics and at the same gives more meaning to the world. Before we can understand and
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describe the complex, we must first grasp the simple (#7). From an understanding of what is
simple, we can build more complex conceptual structures (Goldkuhl, 2002).
Table 1
Seven Conceptualization Maxims
Label
1. The semiotic
maxim
2. The usemeaning maxim

Maxim
Concepts relate words to world. Conceptualization
means moving back and forth between categories,
words, and phenomena.
Conceptual meanings depend on how words are used
and what people have decided words to mean.

3. The tangible
maxim
4. The existence
maxim
5. The relational
maxim

To clarify conceptual distinctions, relate concepts to
actions and what is concrete/tangible.
What is conceptualized must exist somewhere and/or
in some way.
Phenomena are relational; consequently, concepts are
relational.

6. The processual
maxim

Process phenomena are nexuses in social practices.
Process concepts (foundationally expressed as verbs)
are nexuses in descriptions of social practices.

7. The
simplification
maxim

First, clarify simple concepts. Then, based on such
conceptual clarifications, elaborate more complex
concepts.

References
Ogden and Richards
(1923)
James (1907),
Wittgenstein
(1958a),
James (1907), Peirce
(1878)
James (1907)
Dewey (1938),
Emirbayer (1997),
Gibson (1979)
Abbott (1992),
Blumer (1969),
Dewey & Bentley
(1949), Emirbayer
(1997), Rescher
(1997), Weick
(1979),
Wittgenstein (1958b)

Wittgenstein (1958b) has in his Blue Book eloquently stated the need for clarity and
how to reach it through a stepwise procedure (#7):
We shall with great advantage look at primitive forms of language in which
these forms of thinking appear without the confusing background of highly
complicated processes of thought. When we look at such simple forms of
language the mental mist which seems to enshroud our ordinary use of language
disappears. We see activities, reactions, which are clear-cut and transparent. On
the other hand, we recognize in these simple processes forms of language not
separated by a break from our complicated ones. We see that we can build up
the complicated forms from the primitive ones by gradually adding new forms.
(p. 17)
LION: Linguistic Determination
Conceptualization is a cognitive process and as such, it is performed with the aid of
language (Goldkuhl, 2002). Different linguistic constructs (words, phrases) are used to express
and explicate an emergent conceptualization. Language is thus used in such a
conceptualization. The main angle taken in this section is: “How do we speak about
conceptualized phenomena?” To address this query, there is a need to decode the language use
situations in the conceptualization process. This idea of linguistic determination in the LION
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method follows the linguistic turn in science as mentioned above. It depends mainly on maxims
#1, #2, and #5, which emphasize the role of language. Other maxims form the background of
this linguistic analysis. Especially maxim #7 is important since the aim here is to help the
analyst to avoid unnecessary complexities in conceptualization.
During conceptualizing, we use different kinds of words, such as nouns, verbs, and
adjectives. This entails that we speak about entities (normally expressed as nouns), processes
(normally expressed as verbs), and properties (normally expressed as adjectives). However,
language is used in flexible ways with words in different semantic and syntactical roles. This
means that we cannot equate the use of a noun with the existence of an entity-object.
The use of nouns in a conceptualization process is especially problematic. Wittgenstein
has in an eloquent way pronounced a special warning concerning the use of nouns: “We are up
against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look
for a thing that corresponds to it.” (p. 1). Many concepts are often given a substantival form in
a statement although they originally denote a process (verb) or an attribute (adjective).
Nominalization, that is, the creation of a noun from another word class, is often necessary to
make in a language to talk in a grammatically correct way, about such other phenomena as
processes and attributes. For example, talking about the process of people communicating (that
is a verb; here in gerund form), a nominalized word (communication) can be created. This is
often grammatically necessary when topicalizing such phenomena in a statement, that is,
making it grammatically a subject or an object. However, not every scholar is aware of such
nominalization processes and their consequences. There is a risk of falling into a
nominalization trap, that is, searching for the essential thing behind the nominalized concept.
But does the proposed concept really represent a separate thing? Or is it rather be seen as an
attribute of an object, or as an active process? Wittgenstein (1958b) speaks about such
unreflective nominalizations as “primitive, too simple ideas of language” (p.17). He speaks
especially about the problem of giving attributes a substantival form. The nominalization of
verbs may also hide the active and processual character of social life. Weick (1979) urges us
to use verbs (in one form or the other) in inquiring and theorizing.
In conceptualization, it is important to distinguish between different kinds of concepts,
such as entity-objects (expressed as a noun), processes (primarily expressed as a verb),
attributes/properties/states (primarily expressed as an adjective, adverb, or participle of verb)
and relationships (expressed through a preposition or transitive verb).
One way to sharpen the explication of a concept is to conduct a “linguistic analysis” of
a proposed concept (Goldkuhl, 2002). To do this, it is appropriate to state different related word
forms of a concept, such as noun form, verb form, and attribute form. I will use three examples
to illustrate the linguistic determination part of the LION method. First, the example of
“structure” that was originally used in Goldkuhl (2002). The question to raise is: what is
structure? Is it fundamentally an object or a process or an attribute? Different word forms
associated with this concept should be listed:
•
•
•

A structure (noun)
To structure (verb)
A structured… (attribute in participle)

A linguistic analysis can be pursued in the following way: Is any of these words seen
as the original or foundational concept type? Are the other word forms to be seen as derivations
from the basic one? In such an analysis, one can be aided by using an “etymological dictionary”
to read about how words have originated. In the example, the following initial question can be
raised: Does something exist that is only structure? This means an inquiry if this phenomenon
is an entity-object, corresponding to a true noun (i.e., not nominalized from another word form).
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The proper answer to this posed question is no. There will always be the structure “of
something.” The original conception of structure is that it is an attribute of something. A
structure belongs to something as a property of that thing. It does not come by itself separated
from the thing which is given structure. When we use it as a noun, which of course is acceptable
in some language use situations, we mean a structure of something. The verb “to structure”
should mean to create a structure of some object.
This example is further explicated through a situation concerning an author and a text:
The author structures (=activity, expressed as a verb) the text, which leads to a text that has a
good structure (=attribute, expressed as a nominalized property), which is also equivalent to a
well-structured (=attribute, expressed as a participle) text. This illustration can perhaps be
found as overexplicit, but it is made here with the purpose to clarify the different word forms.
A by-product of this example of structure is that it also shows the problem of the
theoretical notion of structure as used in “structure vs. agency” (e.g., Giddens, 1984).
“Structure” seems, in this kind of social theorizing, to be used as an abstracted kind of entity,
not as an attribute of something else.
Two more examples are given to illustrate noun/entity-object respectively verb/process
as foundational concepts. The next example is the concept of a plan. First, different concept
types/word forms:
•
•
•

A plan (noun)
To plan (verb)
A planned… (attribute in participle)

This example is further explicated through a situation concerning a designer and an
implementation process: The designer plans (=activity, expressed as a verb) the
implementation process, which leads to a plan (=symbolic object, expressed as a noun), which
can imply a planned (=attribute, expressed as a participle) implementation process. The
foundational concept type is seen as an entity (a plan) and the others as derivations from this.
The last example is about the concept of communication. Different concept types/word
forms:
•
•
•
•

A communication (noun)
To communicate (verb)
A communicative… (attribute in adjective)
A communicated… (attribute in participle)

This example is further explicated through a situation concerning a buyer and a
purchase order: The buyer is communicative (=attribute, expressed as adjective) concerning
their purchasing preferences, which is followed by the communication (=activity, expressed as
nominalized activity) of an order which is equivalent to that they communicate (=activity,
expressed as a verb) their purchase intention, which leads to a communicated (=attribute,
expressed as a participle) order. The foundational concept type is seen as a process (to
communicate) and the others as derivations from this.
Besides the fact that processes and attributes can be nominalized and appear as nouns,
there is also a need to distinguish between different nouns in sentences. In a sentence that
contains a transitive verb, there will be a grammatical subject and object. The subject is the one
that initiates/performs the process (expressed as a verb) described in the clause. The object is
the entity that the process is directed. Subject is here a grammatical term standing for the noun
that is related to the verb (grammatically the predicate) of the sentence. If a sentence is
expressed in passive voice, this means that the grammatical subject is not the one that performs
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the process. Therefore, in grammar there exists a semantic role of a grammatical agent
(Eastwood, 1994) who is the one initiating, performing, or controlling the process. Therefore,
the concept pair of grammatical agent and grammatical object is used below.
A clarification of concepts as grammatical agents and objects can be important when
applying a relational view (following maxim #5). The three examples from above will be used
for such an illustration. The structure example: “structure” is the process (verb). This means
that the “author” is the agent, and the “text” is the object. The plan example: “plan” is the
process (verb). This means that “designer” is the agent and “implementation” is the object,
which by the way is a nominalized process. The communication example: “communicate” is
the verb. This means that buyer is the agent and “purchase order” is the object.
An important conclusion here is that it is important to be vigilant in conceptualization
when process words and attribute words are presented as nominalizations. To avoid an
erroneous characterization when interpreting processes or attributes as entity-objects, one
should pursue a linguistic analysis as illustrated above. It is also important to clarify semantic
roles and relationships between entities-as-agent, processes, and entities-as-objects. The result
of such analyses is that an evolving concept within a scientific discourse becomes linguistically
determined.
LION: Ontological Determination
The formation of a concept means that phenomena in the world are categorized and
given meaning. The ontological question in conceptualization is to demarcate and designate
the kinds of phenomena that are perceived, thought of, and expressed in language. The
ontological quest includes queries concerning what kind of phenomenon is designated and how
and where it exists in the world. The idea of ontological determination in the LION method
follows the practice turn in social science as mentioned above. It depends mainly on maxims
#3-6, which emphasize ontological aspects. Other maxims form the background of this
ontological analysis. I need also here to emphasize maxim #7 as a reminder to build concepts
stepwise from simple phenomena and not jump too quickly to broad aggregates.
While ontological concerns need to be addressed in multiple areas, my specific focus
in this article is on work-practice and in the spirit of the emergent perspective of practice
theorizing in social science (e.g., Nicolini, 2012; Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 1996, 2001). A
practice is considered a demarcated and meaningful constellation of activities performed by
actors belonging to such a practice. We can for example talk about a strategizing practice, a
manufacturing practice, a marketing practice, or an accounting practice in a firm. We can talk
about a nursing practice in medical care or a teaching and learning practice in a school.
In table 2, a socio-instrumental practice ontology is presented. It answers in general
terms what kinds of phenomena appear in a socio-instrumental practice. What are the
foundational elements of this kind of reality? The ontology helps to answer the questions of
where and how conceptualized phenomena exist (maxim #4). Even if different elements are
discerned in this ontology, these should not be seen as fully separated. A relational and
situational view is applied as stated in maxim #5 and centered around processes (maxim #6).
The presented work-practice ontology is a generalized ontological model that in its generality
covers many types of practices. However, it could and should be expanded and detailed
concerning other types of phenomena in relation to specific types of work-practices. The
elaborated socio-instrumental practice ontology is inspired by different contributions of
practice theorizing (e.g., Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Miettinen et al., 2009; Nicolini, 2012;
Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 1996, 2001; Schmidt, 2014; Simpson, 2009; Whittington, 2006). As
stated by Miettinen et al. (2009) and Nicolini (2012), there is no uniform practice theory. The
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presented practice ontology, in Table 2, is a synthesis made from those mentioned practice
theorists, with the purpose to be useful in concept formation on practice-ontological grounds.
Table 2
Types of Phenomena Following Socio-Instrumental Practice Ontology
(developed from Goldkuhl, 2002, 2005, 2019; Goldkuhl & Röstlinger, 2003)
Meta-category
Human actor
Self-directed doing
Internal doing

Environment-directed
doing

Human personal
knowledge
Human inter-subjective
knowledge of temporary
kind
Human inter-subjective
knowledge of
institutional kind
Temporary information
Enduring information
Informational technoartifact (with artifact
doing)
Physical techno-artifact
(with artifact doing)
Utensil/tool

Institutional actor
Institutional doing
Money
Natural resources

Explanation
Conscious agent, that is, with capability to act in the world.
Overt and/or covert action of a human comprising perception of the
world, receiving objects from the environment, and taking care of oneself.
Covert action of a human that comprises dealing with external stimuli
(experiencing, interpreting), thinking and reflecting about the world, and
deliberation and planning that is related to a possible subsequent
intervention.
Overt action of a human that is intervening in the environment and
comprises all types of communication (semiotically expressing) to others
and physically oriented actions of touching, moving, and changing the
environment.
Intra-subjective knowledge of a single human. This knowledge functions
as an action disposition for that human.
Inter-subjective knowledge shared among humans (a socially narrow
group) and of transient knowledge kind. This knowledge may function as
common action dispositions for that group.
Inter-subjective knowledge shared among a broad group of humans and
of instituted and enduring knowledge kind. This knowledge may function
as common action dispositions for that group and may also be manifested
externally in different ways.
Informational (symbolic) object with an evanescent existence; orally
expressed by humans or temporarily displayed by IT artifacts.
Informational (symbolic) object with a relatively permanent existence;
written or recorded in other ways.
Technical artifact with an agential capability to perform informational
processes through some machinery (hardware) following inscribed and
embedded software. These processes can be performed by the artifact
automatically or in interaction with humans.
Technical artifact with an agential capability to perform physically
oriented processes, either maneuvered by humans or working
independently based on humanly arranged machinery.
Object with physical functions and associated physical purposes. The
object can be actively used by humans or arranged to fulfill some specific
physical purpose but without any agential capability.
Institutionally arranged agent, usually an organizational unity. Such an
actor has been constituted by some humans (principals).
The actions of an institutional actor that are conducted by humans or
techno-artifacts as representing the institutional actor.
Symbolic objects that are used for the exchange of value in society.
Food, raw materials, energy, and other resources.

Key elements in the ontological model are humans and their different types of covert
and overt actions. Overt actions are visible to the environment. Covert actions are invisible.
Through overt actions, an actor is interacting with the physical and social environment, that is,
perceiving/receiving from the environment and intervening in the environment. Three types av
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actions/doings are demarcated (formulated with inspiration from Blumer, 1969; Dewey, 1938;
Gibson, 1979; Goldkuhl, 2005, 2012; Kolb, 1984; Mead, 1938; Wertsch, 1998; and other action
theorists):
•
•
•

Self-directed doing.
Internal doing.
Environment-directed doing.

Many human doings, demarcated as distinguishable actions (from the continual
duration of human activity), will comprise more than one of these three types. All external
actions intervening in the world are based on perceptions and some deliberate anticipation of
expected effects. It is not clear-cut to state where a specific action starts (Goldkuhl, 2012;
Mead, 1938). Many self-directed actions (like eating and personal hygiene) include some
manipulation of external objects. Besides the intentionality of external actions, humans also
“give off” bodily expressions, which may be interpreted by other humans (Goffman, 1959).
Human knowledge is explicitly mentioned in the ontological model. Knowledge is seen in a
pragmatist sense as part of action dispositions that also include normative, emotional, and
intentional elements. This means that knowledge comprises pre-actional capabilities and
intentions and post-actional experiences.
A main division of knowledge/action disposition is made between “personal” (intrasubjective) knowledge and shared (inter-subjective) knowledge. The inter-subjective
knowledge is further divided into (1) transient knowledge shared within a narrow social group
and (2) established knowledge of institutionalized character. Institutional knowledge can be of
different kinds (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Giddens, 1984; Goldkuhl, 2011; Scott, 2014):
cognitive-linguistic (constructs), normative (values, preferences), regulative (rules),
performative (action strategies and tactics) and relational (roles).
A socio-instrumental practice is basically an artificially shaped world with different
kinds of external objects. However, humans belong to nature and utilize resources from nature
(food, raw materials, and energy) for their living. External objects have for their matter an
origin in nature. Humans produce and use external objects. A socio-instrumental practice is
thus not only a practice of humans and their relationships. It is also a world of objects and
artifacts.
Humans are communicating using signs which are manifested as “information,” which
here covers a broad array of semiotic expressions. Communication can occur orally (and leave
temporary information) or in writing (and leave enduring information). Oral and recorded
information objects form a symbolic and discursive realm of socio-instrumental practices.
Humans produce and use material artifacts of diverse kinds. A division is made in the
ontology model into three kinds of material artifacts: (a) Simple “utensils/tools” with built-in
functions (capacities). These are static objects which can be (a1) used in actions by humans to
enhance their physical capability (e.g., a tool like an ax) or (a2) arranged to fulfill a physical
purpose over time (e.g., a hanger that keeps clothes in place). (b) Machine-like artifacts with
physical purposes. These artifacts are technically more advanced than simple tools since they
comprise machinery (techno-artifacts). This makes them also into performative objects with
operational capability; that is an agent. Such an artifact can be b1) a maneuverable machine
(e.g., a car) or b2) an automaton (e.g., washing machine). This (second) class of artifacts is
aimed at and used for physical purposes, e.g., moving or transforming matter. In Table 2, it is
called “physical techno-artifact.” All three types of mentioned material artifacts (a-c) have
physical substance and appearance. In that sense they are physical. However, classes a and b
have physical purposes. (c) The third category of artifacts has informational and
communicative purposes. It is in Table 2 called “informational techno-artifact.” It builds on
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information technology (digital technology) and such artifacts can be called IT artifacts or
digital artifacts. Such an artifact has, of course, a physical basis (hardware), but its essence is
the handling of information and communication. They are thus symbolic machines. Digital
artifacts will thus contain digitally recorded communication (in databases, user-interfaces, and
message transferring). A digital artifact has an operational capability through its implemented
software; thus, being a kind of agent.
Another special kind of artifact is “money.” They are symbolic but they have a special
institutional existence through their capacity to be used for the exchange of value in society.
All these phenomena have clear existences as perceivable phenomena. Both physical
artifacts and information objects/artifacts have separate existences that can be sensed by
humans. Besides these phenomena, there is a special kind of object in the ontology: an
“institutional actor.” This is an organization or an organizational unit or some similar kind of
social and institutional arrangement. An institutional actor cannot be sensed in the same way
as other phenomena. An organization is institutionally created and constituted by humans and
given a separate, socially identifiable, and agreed identity and an action capability. An
organization cannot, as an institutional construction, act by itself. Its actions are performed by
agents (humans or artifacts) that represent the organization (Ahrne, 1994; Goldkuhl, 2005;
Goldkuhl & Röstlinger, 2003; King et al., 2011; Taylor & Van Every, 2000).
As said, an organization is an institutional and abstract object, which cannot be sensed
as a concrete object in the same way as other objects in the ontology model. However, there
might often be concrete objects that are owned by an institutional actor, and such an actor can
have humans, through contracts, as its members. Performers, like human members and owned
or hired techno-artifacts, can conduct actions in its name. Even if there are such linkages to
concrete objects, an institutional actor cannot, in total, be reduced to its constituents. It is
therefore meaningful to have this as a special kind of phenomenon in the socio-instrumental
practice ontology.
In the inter-subjective sphere, there exists knowledge that is shared among humans. For
example, in an organization there can exist a business strategy that is shared among
organizational members. One can talk about this as a “knowledge object” since it is distinct
and demarcated in relation to other knowledge-items. It is possible to judge what is in the
business strategy and what is not, although there can be some fuzzy boundaries due to different
interpretations. A business strategy does not, however, exist only as a knowledge object in
humans. Probably, the business strategy is written down and given a linguistic form. It is thus
also manifested as an external symbolic object (enduring information in the ontology model).
This means that a business strategy exists within two realms: (a) the inter-subjective cognitive
realm and (b) the external symbolic realm. The phenomenon of a business strategy is thus a socalled “multi-existent phenomenon” (Goldkuhl, 2002). The ontological question – “Where
does this phenomenon exist?” – will be responded to by dual answers: It exists as intersubjective knowledge and it exists as an external document. We cannot not, however, take for
granted that there is a full equivalence between the cognitive object and the document object.
There might be differences between the linguistic manifestation and the human conceptions.
There might also be differences and tensions between different persons’ apprehensions of the
strategy. We can thus distinguish between and talk about strategy-as-document and strategyas-knowledge as different manifestations of strategy. However, sometimes we do not need to
make such a differentiation but rather talk about the strategy as a conjunct phenomenon. When
we talk about such a multi-existent phenomenon, we can call it a “social knowledge object.”
This concept is defined in the following way: A social knowledge object will be multi-existent
having related manifestations: (a) inter-subjective knowledge among knowledgeable human
actors, and (b) document(s) expressing this knowledge and as an external object accessible to
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people to inspect and use. Other examples of social knowledge objects are theory, method,
regulation, policy, contract, and standard.
The ontological typology can be seen as a list of foundational types of phenomena that
exist in socio-instrumental practices. In that sense, it may help an inquirer to identify and reflect
on phenomena to study and theorize in a research endeavor. Even if the types of phenomena
are described as distinguishable and thus separate elements, they should not be treated as
isolated elements without relations to each other. They appear always in social practice
situations where they exist relationally to each other (Dewey, 1938; Emirbayer, 1997). The
understanding of a specific phenomenon of some kind should be made in relation to the
contextual whole of which it is a constituent (maxim #5).
I have labeled this ontology a socio-instrumental practice ontology (Goldkuhl, 2002;
2005; 2019; Goldkuhl & Röstlinger, 2003). I have not used labels such as realist or
constructivist (Chua, 1986; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Podsakoff et al., 2016). The ontology
can be interpreted as an integration of realist and constructivist views (Tsoukas, 2000)
following the spirit of pragmatist philosophy (Blumer, 1969; Dewey, 1938; Goldkuhl, 2012).
The ontology is realist since it emphasizes the existence of external objects of physical and
semiotic character. It is constructivist since it acknowledges inter-subjective knowledge and
institutional constructions. The world is seen as both external facticity and intersubjective
reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).
LION: Synthesizing the Method
In this section, I will synthesize the linguistic and ontological views to generate a list
of fundamental meta-concepts to use in the conceptualization process. This means that I will
integrate the two frameworks (linguistics and ontology) described above. I will then describe
how the seven conceptualization maxims, elaborated above, constitute the perspectival
foundation for the LION method. Further, I outline a procedure consisting of essential
questions to ask in conceptual analysis.
Synthesizing Linguistic and Ontological Views
Fundamental concepts of socio-instrumental practices include entity-objects, processes,
and constellations of entity-objects and processes. Entity-objects concern the actors and
artifacts within situations, whereas processes are those activities and actions that occur within
situations, and constellations are the networks, and assemblages linking and comprising entities
and processes. Entity-objects, processes, and constellations can be “possessor-objects.” Such
possessor-objects have “properties/attributes.” This means that properties are not separate
categorized objects, they are attributes of possessor-objects.
Entity-objects have usually a separate existence or are at least considered a socially
identifiable object. A fundamental division is made between static objects vs. performative
agents (i.e., objects with a capability to execute some process). A “static object” can be a
“physical object/artifact” (a utensil/tool that needs to be handled by actors), a “symbolic object”
(recorded information or temporary information), or a “knowledge object” (an identifiable
cognitive-immaterial object). A knowledge object can, however, not be seen as a separate
object since it is a part of a human’s knowledge. An external static object does not have any
performative capability, but it has a capacity/function in relation to its user. Such capacity
(informative or physical) can be exercised by a performer in action. Linguistically, we can say
that a static object does something (as affording some function) to a user, although that object
does not perform anything actively by itself. It is not a performative doing; what the static
object does is to bring a function as a potential to be used.
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A “performative agent” is an entity with a capability to execute a process in a deliberate
way; it can also be called a performer or doer. Performative agents can be divided into actors
and arti-doers. “Actors are humans” (individuals or collectives) or “institutional actors”
(organizations); that is, those that are considered legally responsible for their actions. Humans
can appear as private individuals or as representatives of organizations. The term “arti-doer”
denotes technical artifacts with a capability to perform operations. There exist different kinds
of such “technical artifacts;” many operate with physical effects. There exist also symbolic
machines, like “digital artifacts” that process information. Such symbolic operations can mimic
human actions; therefore, they can be called pre-arranged symbolic actions (Collins & Kusch,
1998).
“Processes” can be “actions/activities” performed by actors or “technical operations”
performed by arti-doers. A “human individual action” can be performed (a) without any
instrumental support other than own body or (b) with linguistic instruments (as in
communication) or (c) with physical instruments (as in an action aiming for physical effects).
There can be “human collective actions.” Such action can be performed jointly or distributed
(i.e., with tasks distributed among a collective). Organizations conduct “institutional actions,”
however, not by themselves (Ahrne, 1994; Goldkuhl, 2005; Goldkuhl & Röstlinger, 2003;
Taylor & Van Every, 2000). Those actions are performed by their representatives (humans or
arti-doers). One can also talk about “ensemble activities” that consist of actions/operations
performed by humans, organizations, and arti-doers. Many processes are arranged and
intentional, however, there exist also many unintentional and accidental processes and events.
There exist also multi-existent objects (Goldkuhl, 2002) with related manifestations,
so-called “social knowledge objects.” In such a case, there is a close linkage and
correspondence between a cognitive inter-subjective object and an external symbolic object as
a document.
What can be called an “artifact-object” is usually seen as a separate entity (i.e., having
separate existence)? Such separate objects can be grouped with other related objects forming
“object-ensembles.” This can sometimes be done only in view/thought (as thought constructs),
but of course often as “aggregate products.” Such artifact objects consist of different
“components” that make an artifact function in an intentional way. These object-components
are integral and embedded parts of the artifact.
In socio-instrumental practices, different “phenomena” (like objects, processes, and
properties) are never isolated. They “exist” always “relationally,” both in the practice-reality
and in language. For example, actors and arti-doers execute processes. Static objects and
techno-artifacts are created by actors through their actions, and they are used by actors in
actions. A property (of one possessor-object) should also be seen as relational to other objects.
For example, properties of a tool or a techno-artifact are relational to a human actor (user) and
its use in actions; cf. the notions of affordance and constraints (Gibson, 1979; Wertsch, 1998).
The consequence of this is that a concept should be described in relation to other concepts.
Besides these mentioned concepts, there exist other foundational concepts, such as time
and place (Giddens, 1984; Schatzki, 1996).
The Seven Conceptualization Maxims and the LION Method
The LION method builds upon the seven conceptualization maxims as its perspectival
foundation. In Table 3, I have clarified in what ways these seven maxims have influenced the
LION approach.
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Table 3
The Seven Conceptualization Maxims Related to Linguistic and Ontological Determinations in the
LION Approach
Maxim
1. The
semiotic
maxim
2. The usemeaning
maxim
3. The tangible
maxim
4. The
existence
maxim

5. The
relational
maxim

6. The
processual
maxim

7. The
simplification
maxim

Application in LION
Overall background for LION. Emphasis on
the back-and-forth movement between
words (linguistic orientation) and
phenomena (ontological orientation).
An awareness that a concept and its
linguistic equivalence (a word) is employed
with an intended use-meaning.
Concepts should either designate processes
or be possible to relate to processes and also
to other tangible ontological kinds.
An understanding that a categorized
phenomenon must have some existence in
socio-instrumental practices; and thus, that
it should be possible to ontologically
determine.
A phenomenon should be clearly related
ontologically to other phenomena. From this
follows that concepts appear in relational
structures that can be linguistically
expressed accordingly.
Ontologically, an orientation to doings
(actions, processes) in practices.
Linguistically, an awareness of how
processes are codified (as verbs and
sometimes as nouns).
Elementary concepts should have a clear
and unequivocal linguistic form and have
clear references to ontological kinds.
Complex/aggregate concepts need to be
based on more elementary concepts.

Essential questions
What kind of word is this?
What kind of phenomenon is this?

What should we mean by this
concept/word?
When this concept/word is used what kind
of tangibility in practices is presumed?
Where does this phenomenon exist? How
does this phenomenon exist?

What other kinds of phenomena does this
type of phenomenon relate to?
How does this word/concept appear
together with other words/concepts in
statements?
What doings/processes occur in practices?
What words denote doings/processes in
practices?

Can this concept be unequivocally
determined from a linguistic and an
ontological perspective?
If the concept seems to be hard to grasp
(due to complexity, abstractness,
aggregation), how can it be built from
graspable concepts?

This table consists of, besides the list of maxims, two more columns. The second
column describes how each maxim is applied when using the LION approach. In the third
column, this is further operationalized in typical questions to ask during concept formation
according to LION.
The LION Procedure for Concept Formation
A conceptual analysis (consisting of linguistic and ontological determination) can be
used whenever dealing with concepts in scientific work. The LION procedure consists mainly
of “a set of generative questions” for the inquirer to ask. Such a question-oriented mode of
action is common in many research-methodological approaches (e.g., Charmaz, 2014; Nicolini,
2012). A conceptual analysis following the LION method should bring more clarity and rigor
to the conceptualization process. Four important use situations, where conceptual clarification
is needed, are:
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1. When developing inquiry interests and research questions (what to study);
a LION analysis can be performed as a pre-reflection about an empirical
domain with different phenomena to be addressed.
2. When developing concepts that arise from inquiry processes in data
generation and analysis.
3. When investigating concepts that might be brought into inquiry processes
from extant scholarly discourses (i.e., existing theories and frameworks).
4. When articulating the final theoretical contribution (consisting of concepts
and theoretical statements) from a research study.
A conceptual analysis can follow this suggested “procedure of sequential steps”: (a)
Start with a “linguistic analysis” of a proposed concept, (b) Then continue with an “ontological
analysis” of this concept, (c) Further “refinements” can be made by “alternating” between
linguistic and ontological analysis, (d) Widen the scope and relate the focused concept to other
concepts. Such a “relational analysis” should be conducted with linguistic and ontological eyes.
The goal of a LION conceptual analysis is to reach a conceptual clarification. Such a conceptual
clarification can be used as a basis in different parts of the research process as empirical
investigation, data analysis, and theorizing.
Ask the following and similar “linguistic questions”: How do we speak of this
phenomenon? What is the proposed word form? What other related word forms exist (nouns,
verbs, attributes)? What can be said to be the primary word form? What other words can be
seen as linguistic derivatives from the primary word form? This linguistic analysis should lead
to a determination of conceptualized phenomenon to be an entity, process, aggregate, relation,
or attribute. Ask the following and similar “ontological questions”: Where and how does this
phenomenon exist in the socio-instrumental world? What is the foundational character of the
phenomenon? Does it have several forms of manifestations, that is, is it a multi-existent
phenomenon? Is it an ensemble of several phenomena? If so, what is the character of its
components? If it is a knowledge object or informational object, what kinds of phenomena does
it refer to? Ask the following and similar “relational questions”: What is the position of this
phenomenon in relation to other phenomena? If it is an actor/agent, what typical actions does
the actor/agent perform? If it is an external object or an internal knowledge object, by what
type of actor/agent and what type of action is the object generated? And, in what actions and
by whom are the object used, and for what purposes? If it is a process, which performers (actors,
arti-doers) partake in the conduct of the process?
A LION Analysis Example: Value and Value Creation in Service Logic
As an illustration of a linguistic and ontological analysis of concepts, I use a published
paper by Grönroos (2017) on value and value creation in service management and marketing.
Grönroos states that “value is an elusive concept … [that] suffers from ‘fuzzy definitional
problems’” (Grönroos, p. 126). This makes it a suitable candidate for conceptual analysis. I am
below making a conceptual inquiry of Grönroos’ conceptual inquiry. This can be said to
correspond to the third conceptualization situation mentioned in the LION procedure section
above. The purpose of this section is to illustrate the LION way of thinking and working
through a concrete example and thus help potential method users how to apply the method.
I focus on two concepts (value and value creation) in Grönroos’ conceptualization.
Grönroos has based his work on the service logic tradition (Vargo & Lusch, 2008), which
emphasizes that a service perspective should be applied to both services and goods. Value
creation is an important concept in the interaction between the provider and the customer (C).
Grönroos (2017) emphasizes that the customer is the main actor creating value and he has
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further elaborated on the value concept. The value to the customer is pin-pointed to be valuein-use. I will re-use three examples from Grönroos (2017): The laundry of a shirt, a purchased
electric car, and a purchased piece of art for illustration of my reasoning. The value arises from
the use of each product (my terminology for coverage of goods and services), the “wearing” of
a shirt, the “driving” of the car, and the “viewing” of the painting. I apply these primary product
uses below, although there exist (as Grönroos also mentions) other possible product uses. There
can, for example, be situations where C talks about being an owner of an electric car.
I start with a linguistic analysis of value. Different word forms are:
•
•
•
•

A value (noun)
To value (verb)
A valuable… (attribute in adjective)
A valued… (attribute in participle)

Etymologically “value” originates from Latin valere (participle) meaning “be of value;
be worth” (etymonline.com). This means that value should not be considered as a separate
entity. Value does not exist separately, but always as the value of something. Basically, this is
an attributive concept; determined that something is valuable. The word value should be
acknowledged as a nominalization of the attribute “valuable.” When Grönroos introduces the
concept of “value-in-use” it is obviously related to the customer’s use of each product, that is,
the wearing, driving, and viewing. The Grönroos concept of value-in-use is problematic since
it might mislead the reader to believe that it is value as an entity that is used. However, value
is not a separate entity, it is an attribute of something. The terminology value-in-use is also
problematic since it conceals the object (i.e., the product) that is used. The product is made
implicit through the term “value-in-use.”
I am following the linguistic conclusion from above, that value should be seen as an
attribute of something. In this case, it should be considered as an attribute of the ensemble
“product-in-use.” It is the product-in-use that is considered valuable. This ensemble consists of
two elements, a product (an entity-object such as a shirt, a car, and a painting) and the use of
the product (an activity such as wearing, driving, and viewing). This ensemble is a constellation
of a noun (a product as object) and a verb (using as process), and the attribute (valuable) is thus
a property of this constellation. As said, a conclusion from this analysis is that the terminology
“value-in-use” (as described by Grönroos) is inadequate and might be misleading. A more
articulate terminology would be “value of product-in-use.” If Grönroos’ shorter
concept/wording is used, we need to remind ourselves that this is an “abbreviation” where the
product is made implicit, and that value is not a separate entity, but something attributed to the
ensemble.
How should we conceive of value from an ontological standpoint? Value of productin-use is not a substantial property of the ensemble. It is rather an ascribed attribute (Bunge,
1977). It is the result of the customer valuing the use of the product, which entails that,
ontologically, the value is C:s valuative knowledge about the product-in-use. Value is not a
separate knowledge object; it is an attributive part of the customer’s knowledge about the
product in use.
By the concept of “value creation,” Grönroos is emphasizing that the provider does
only create something that has a value potential, and thus not value. The value is the result of
the customer’s use of the product. It is asserted that the customer creates value through C:s use.
A linguistic analysis of “creation” looks like this:
•
•

A creation (noun)
To create (verb)
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•
•

A creative… (attribute in adjective)
A created… (attribute in participle)

The foundational concept here is clearly the verb “create,” etymologically originated
from the Latin verb “to make grow” (etymonline.com). The word “creation” is a polyseme with
the meanings of (a) the noun/object of something created and (b) a nominalized activity (from
the verb create). “Value creation” in Grönroos framework is clearly meant the activity of
creating value that is, the process of creation and not an object of something created. However,
we need to reflect on what it means to create value since value is not a created entity. It should
rather mean something like creating what is valuable in an object. The process of a customer’s
“value creation” needs to be conceptually unfolded. There are (a) activities of using external
objects/products performed by the customer (wearing, driving, viewing), and based on these
use-activities there are (b) experiential assessments of the use-situation to estimate how
valuable the product-in-use is to C. What can we generally say about what it is that is estimated
as valuable? What is estimated as valuable needs to be connected to certain properties of the
products, such as the cleanness of the shirt, the transport capability of the car, and the artistic
qualities of the painting. These properties (possibly found valuable by the customer) are
however not created by C. They are created (developed/put into place) by the provider. When
Grönroos accentuate that the customer creates value this seems to be a far-fetched terminology.
The customer uses a product (and thus creates a product-in-use situation) and based on this, C
finds/estimates/ascribes the product-in-use to be valuable to C. Neither the use-action nor the
value estimation creates the properties of the product that are found valuable. What is called
customers’ value creation by Grönroos, could rather be called “valuation” or “value
estimation.” Valuation is thus a process of the customer’s experiencing and estimating the
value of C:s use of the product. The result of this valuation process is the customer’s valuative
knowledge about the product-in-use, and it is not the creation of value as some separate entity.
See e.g., Yuan & Wu (2008) about customers’ experiential knowledge about products and how
this contributes to customer satisfaction. Ontologically, valuation is a covert actor process
where experiences from activities dealing with external objects are transformed into a value
opinion. This becomes part of the actor’s personal knowledge of post-actional character.
The process of valuing the product-in-use can be characterized in different ways
depending on the outcome of the valuation:
•
•
•

Value confirmation is when the outcome corresponds to value expectations.
Value disconfirmation is when the outcome does not reach value
expectations.
Value discovery is when the outcome exceeds value expectations.

Grönroos (2017) has discussed important distinctions and insights concerning valuesin-use and value creation. It is important to admit that providers cannot produce and deliver
value which can be read in many papers on marketing. It is equally important to acknowledge
the role of customers concerning how value arises. However, as shown above, the proposed
terminology and conceptualization of Grönroos (2017) might be misleading. I take the
mentioned messages from Grönroos and transform them into theoretical statements based on
the conducted linguistic and ontological analysis: It is important to conceptually distinguish
and thus also to apply a proper terminology between (a) the “provider creating” products and
their properties “with a potential of being valuable” to customers and (b) the “customers’
experiential use” of products and their properties and (c) the “customer’s” subsequent
“valuation” leading to an “experienced value of product-in-use.” To clarify the conceptual
differences between Grönroos’ conceptual analysis and the one accomplished here through the
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application of the LION method, I have made a comparative table (Table 4). I have selected
two paragraphs from the abstract of Grönroos (2017) and I have re-formulated these paragraphs
based on the LION analysis pursued above. Conceptual differences are highlighted in the table.
Table 4
A Comparison Between Grönroos (2017) Original Concepts/Labels and the Concepts/Labels that were
Results of the LION Re-conceptualization
Grönroos (2017) description (quotes)
To develop a managerially relevant
understanding of value and value creation, these
phenomena must be analysed on a micro level.
Seen from above, they lack a microfoundation.

The customer not only determines value but is
also the value creator. By facilitating
customers’ value creation, the firm provides
potential value, which evolves as value-in-use
during use or consumption.

LION re-conceptualization
To develop a managerially relevant
understanding of value and value determination
of product-in-use, and creation of value
potential of products, these phenomena must be
analysed on a micro level. Seen from above,
they lack a microfoundation.
The customer determines value of product-inuse and is thus the value estimator. By
facilitating customers’ product use and value
determination, the firm provides a product with
a potential value, which evolves as estimated
value of product-in-use during its use or
consumption.

The conceptual analysis with linguistic and ontological determination presented above
comprises also a relational analysis. The conceptual analysis has also clarified relationships
between phenomena like customer, provider, value, valuation, product, product use, product
generation, product property, and value potential.
Discussion: LION Application in Qualitative Research
In this discussion, I ponder over some implications, and I give some advice and
recommendations. The discussion is mainly devoted to relating the LION method to other
approaches in qualitative research. As said, a LION analysis can be conducted in different
situations of a qualitative research process. I discuss the application of LION in such situations
(research question formulation, collection, and analysis of data, review of extant theory, and
final articulation of theoretical contribution).
Alvesson and Sandberg (2011) have suggested, as an alternative to gap-spotting, a
problematization route to “formulating research questions.” This comprises problematization
and challenging of key assumptions in extant theories. One element of such a critical study of
some selected literature could be the conduct of a LION analysis of key concepts “root
metaphors,” as Alvesson and Sandberg (2011) describe them. A discovery of conceptual
obscurities and problems could guide the formulation of research questions and the subsequent
empirical investigations and further conceptual inquiry. The analysis above, of the Grönroos
case (value creation in service logic), could be seen as an example of a conceptual
problematization inquiry. Such a conceptual analysis might be followed by an empirical
investigation of customers and their valuations of product use. There exist other strategies to
research question formulation (Alvehus, 2020) such as gap-spotting in extant literature (e.g.,
Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997) or driven by practical problems (e.g., Corley & Gioia, 2011;
Schein, 2001). Whatever strategy is chosen, the formulated research questions will contain
some main categories that refer to important phenomena to inquire. Such main concepts within
research questions should be addressed through a “pre-empirical reflection,” which can be
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conducted by using LION principles as shown in Goldkuhl (2022). It is, however, important
that this pre-empirical analysis of concepts will not lead to decided and strictly demarcated
definitions. The idea of using LION principles at this early stage of research is to be better
prepared for empirical studies but not to limit an open-minded search for data and a possible
reconfiguration of initial assumptions of conceptual character.
“Analysis of qualitative data” can be made following the grounded theory (GT)
approach. Initially, it was one concerted approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), but GT has now
evolved into many different variants. Although, the existence of methodological and
conceptual/terminological differences, there exist similarities among such different
approaches. The “coding of data” is central in GT data analysis. The coding process can be
divided into two or sometimes three phases. The initial phase is called open coding (Strauss,
1987) or substantive/open coding (Glaser, 1978), or initial coding (Charmaz, 2014). Gioia et
al. (2013) calls this phase “1st-order analysis” with the use of informant-centric terms and
codes. The next phase is called by Gioia et al. (2013) “2nd-order analysis” with the use of
researcher-centric concepts, themes, and dimensions. In this phase, there is an “abstraction and
concept formation” that is made based on initial codes which are close to data and sometimes
made using linguistic constructs (in vivo codes) from the studied practice. As said, there exist
variations among the different GT approaches. Strauss (1987) describes this as axial coding
and selective coding. Glaser (1978) speaks about selective and theoretical coding. Charmaz
(2014) uses the term focused coding. A LION analysis could be useful in the process of going
from initial/open/1st-order codes to the abstracted 2nd-order concepts. A linguistic and
ontological analysis of the proposed concepts can help clarify these conceptual building blocks.
It should be further useful when “clarifying the relations between different concepts” as is made
in the relational analysis called axial coding (Charmaz, 2014; Strauss, 1987). This is fully in
line with the relational maxim of LION (#5). In the Straussian approach to GT, an action frame
is used in the axial coding, where conditions, strategies, and consequences related to actions
are explicated (Strauss, 1987). This is in line with the processual maxim of LION (#6).
The abstracted concepts from this GT-phase are used, in “theoretical sampling,” to
direct further collection and analysis of data. This means that these abstractions can be seen as
“tentative concepts” due to further refinement or perhaps elimination if not found appropriate.
It is therefore important that a LION clarification is not made too definitive but leaves
possibilities for further conceptual evolvement.
The review of existing literature can be made on different occasions during a qualitative
research process. Thornberg and Dunne (2019) distinguish between three such occasions: (a)
prior to data collection, (b) concomitant with iterative collection and analysis of data, and (c)
during finalizing the contribution from the research study. There exist different approaches to
literature reviews, such as concept-centric, author-centric, and orientational reading (Boell &
Ceczez-Kecmanovic, 2014; Webster & Watson, 2002; Wolfswinkel et al., 2013). Conceptcentric reviews are emphasized by these authors, although they do not give detailed advice
concerning the procedure for concept analysis. Linguistic and ontological analyses of salient
and relevant concepts in selected literature should be performed. The literature review during
iterative data collection and analysis is crucial for conceptual and theoretical development. As
emphasized, by Eisenhardt (1989) and Charmaz (2014), extant concepts should not be taken
for granted but they need to earn their place in relation to the abstractions made from collected
data. A LION analysis of concepts from extant literature should be made with a critical eye and
a constructive attitude of making “fitting adaptations” in relation to the ongoing conceptual
development.
The described situations above pertain to conceptualization in progress. Scholars make
provisional concept formations during an inquiry that should be open to further elaboration
through empirical and theoretical developments. Even if theories and other scientific
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knowledge, from a pragmatist stance (Dewey, 1938), always should be seen as provisional and
in progress, it is necessary to stabilize concepts in the “final articulation of a theoretical
contribution.” When drawing insights together in preparing a scholarly publication, it is
necessary to be distinct and temporarily resolute concerning evolved conceptualizations. The
concepts that are used in a theoretical statement need to be clear and understandable (Corley &
Gioia, 2011; Whetten, 1989). All concepts that are elements in final theoretical statements
should benefit from linguistic and ontological clarifications. Concepts are the “what” of theory,
as Whetten (1989) declares; different “factors, variables, constructs” (p. 490). Whetten adds a
how-question to theory-building, which means addressing issues of causality. The “what” and
how elements are the main building blocks for theories since they “constitute the domain or
subject of the theory” (Whetten, 1989 p. 491). This division into what and how can be related
to the LION framework above. The what elements seem to relate to entity-objects and how
elements to process-categories. From a LION perspective, it is of course, possible, and
appropriate to distinguish between entity elements and process elements in theorizing.
However, it is important to acknowledge the indispensable role of processes and actions when
describing practices in a theorized way. There is an obvious risk in variance-theorizing
(Langley, 1999), to restrict oneself to entity-objects with attributes that constitute both
independent and dependent variables in theoretical explanations. The human/social processes
that are the generators/transformers of effects (in the dependent variables) might be excluded
(Abbott, 1992; Emirbayer, 1997), which can occur already through a narrow data collection,
or at least at last through an entity/variable-focused abstraction process when formulating the
theoretical outcome. The LION conceptualization maxims of tangibility (#3) and process
orientation (#6) direct inquiry and theorizing to formulate and include explicit process
categories in theoretical statements. The risk of (perhaps unreflectingly) excluding process
categories from theoretical statements will thus be reduced if a LION analysis is applied.
As emphasized by Sutton & Saw (1995), data is not theory. However, since data are the
ultimate building blocks for theory formation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Weick, 1979), they will
be recurrently helpful when articulating the final theory outcome. Gioia et al. (2013) have
elaborated a model (a data structure), which shows explicit links from raw data to the abstracted
concepts that will appear as elements in theory outcomes. This type of approach can, in an
adapted way, be used for the application of the tangibility maxim of LION (#3). Theoretical
statements can be demonstrated through empirical examples. A brief narrative can be used to
make an abstract theoretical statement graspable (Abbott, 1992). This can be called a
“prototypical instantiation” of theoretical statements. However, it should be noted that the data
structure approach of Gioia et al. (2013) mainly focuses on singular concepts at a time. A LION
approach would apply the relational maxim (#5) and show the link between (a) a theoretical
statement (including its “relationships” between concepts) and (b) “relational” phenomena in
an empirical illustration.
As mentioned in my review of discourses above, Podsakoff et al. (2016) have
contributed a “life cycle” procedure for concept formation. A performance of linguistic and
ontological analysis could be integrated into their different phases of attribute specification,
preliminary definition, and further conceptual refinement. However, the LION approach does
not view concept formation as a separate research task, as made by Podsakoff et al. (2016), but
rather as “supportive activities well integrated” into the different phases of the qualitative
inquiry process as indicated above in this section.
Concluding Reflections
One pivotal ideal in qualitative research is to develop knowledge in close contact with
and based on the subjective understanding and rationality of informants. Gioia et al. (2013, p.
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17) emphasize the importance to “to give voice to the informants in … data gathering and
analysis and also to represent their voices prominently in the reporting of the research.”
Spradley (1979) states that “any explanation of behavior which excludes what the actors
themselves know, how they define their actions, remains a partial explanation that distorts the
human situation” (p. 13). I fully agree with this ideal of qualitative research generating data in
terms of the informants’ definitions of situations. What can also be noted is that we as inquirers
should not take concepts from informants for granted and that we should not avoid any critical
scrutiny of the social constructs emanating from them.
One tactic in data analysis is “in vivo coding” (Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Saldaña, 2016).
This means the use of linguistic constructs from informants and the studied practice.
Sometimes, it can be appropriate to use words and concepts from the inquired practice directly
in the theorizing process. However, there might be situations where these constructs are
inadequate building blocks for conceptual development. Data as results from interviews, focus
groups, and self-reports consist of statements that might be formulated through in vivo
language. Such expressions might hopefully be clear, but they might also be confused, biased,
prejudiced, faddish, or ignorant. What is expressed can be overgeneralizations, idealizations,
hearsay, wishful thinking, whitewash, or based on random observations. Such data should not
be dismissed in an analysis, but the inquirer needs to be cautious of what to use and how to use
it. There is a necessity to be source-critical in assessing data (Scott, 1990). Even if we have
close contact with the empirical social world and obtain data directly as expressions from
informants, we cannot presuppose that such expressed constructs are appropriate building
blocks in our scientific conceptualization process. A LION analysis, that unravels linguistic
and ontological foundations of proposed constructs, can bring more clarity and rigor to
conceptualization.
We can thus not take for granted that in vivo constructs, directly obtained from
informants, are proper vantage points for the development of concepts. As was shown above,
in the example of service value, we cannot take for granted that scholarly developed concepts
are appropriate to be used in a continued conceptual and theoretical development process. What
we bring into our conceptual development, from the empirical realm or from the scholarly
knowledge base, needs to be scrutinized and the presented LION method is one resource for
such a conceptualization process.
The LION method is intended for the social researcher’s toolbox of research methods.
Its aim is, through active use, to bring clarity and rigor to conceptual analyses that can occur
on various occasions in the research process: when clarifying knowledge interests and research
questions, when preparing empirical inquiries, when analyzing data generated through such
inquiries, when inspecting extant theories and concepts to possibly select and develop concepts
for integration into emergent theory, and when elaborating a final/contributed theory from the
conducted research. The method, in its entirety and its sub-parts, should be seen as a response
to the stated research questions about rigor in conceptualizing and clarity in resulting
conceptualizations.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this concept formation method has emerged based
on my research experiences from a wide range of organizational work-practices. My view is
that this method is applicable in such types of work-practices as well as others. The method
consists of two related modules, one linguistic and one ontological. I cannot see any domain
restrictions to apply the linguistic module in social research. For the ontological module, as
founded in practice theorizing, there might be domain restrictions outside the stated area of
organizational work. This restricted scope of application can be found as a “limitation” of the
method. However, the formulation of the practice ontology as part of the LION method is made
with inspiration from emergent practice philosophy (e.g., Nicolini, 2012; Reckwitz, 2002;
Schatzki, 1996, 2001; Schmidt, 2014). This literature has wide claims of generality, far beyond
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organizational work. This means that it should be possible to apply this part of the method
outside this stated domain. I also foresee the possibility to modify or replace this stated
ontology model with another model based on other ontological grounds, but still inspired by
the foundational conceptualization principles and questions within the LION method.
Finally, some remarks on “unanswered questions” and possible “future work.” Besides
the application and report of experiences from the use of this method, there are several other
possible routes for future research. As said, the LION method has originated within qualitativepragmatist research on organizational work. My belief is that this method for conceptual
analysis can be useful in other settings of social research and in research pursued within other
research paradigms. I can also foresee a possible use within quantitatively oriented research
and look forward to the use and adaptation in such research orientations.
Acknowledgements
The ideas of linguistic and ontological conceptualization have been applied in
collaborative research for many years. I have also used these ideas in teaching and supervising
PhD candidates and master students. Through these intellectual interactions, I have continually
sharpened views, categories, procedures, and questions for concept formation. I am most
grateful for all these valuable responses to my ideas. I am also very grateful to the editor and
the reviewers of TQR for their demanding and insightful comments, which helped me to write
a better paper.
References
Abbott, A. (1992). What do cases do? Some notes on activity in sociological analysis. In C.
Ragin & H. Becker (Eds.), What is a case? Exploring the foundations of social inquiry
(pp. 53-82). Cambridge University Press.
Ahrne, G. (1994). Social organizations. Interaction inside, outside and between organization.
SAGE.
Alvehus, J. (2020). Formulating research problems. Studentlitteratur.
Alvesson, M., & Kärreman, D. (2000). Taking the linguistic turn in organizational research.
Challenges, responses, consequences. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 36(2),
136-158.
Alvesson, M., & Sandberg, J. (2011). Generating research questions through problematization.
Academy of Management Review, 36(2), 247-271.
Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality. Doubleday & Co.
Bergmann, G. (1953). Logical positivism, language and the reconstruction of metaphysics.
Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia, 8(4), 453-481.
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method. University of California
Press.
Boell, S., & Cecez-Kecmanovic, D. (2014). A hermeneutic approach for conducting literature
reviews and literature searches, Communications of AIS, 34, Article 12.
Bryant, A. (2002). Re-grounding grounded theory. Journal of Information Technology Theory
and Application, 4(1), 25-42.
Bunge, M. (1977). Treatise on basic philosophy, volume 3 – ontology I: The furniture of the
world. Reidel.
Charmaz, K. (2014). Constructing grounded theory (2nd ed.). SAGE.
Chua, W. (1986). Radical development in accounting thought. The Accounting Review, 61(4),
601-632.
Collins, H., & Kusch, M. (1998). The shape of actions. What humans and machines can do.
MIT Press.

2740

The Qualitative Report 2022

Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (2015). Basics of qualitative research. Techniques and procedures
for developing Grounded Theory (4th ed.). SAGE.
Corley, K., & Gioia, D. (2011). Building theory about theory building: What constitutes a
theoretical contribution? Academy of Management Review, 36(1), 12–32.
Dewey, J. (1938). Logic: The theory of inquiry. Henry Holt.
Dewey, J., & Bentley, A. (1949). Knowing and the known. Beacon Press.
Dubin, R. (1969). Theory building. Free Press.
Dubois, A., & Gadde L.-E. (2002). Systematic combining: An abductive approach to case
research. Journal of Business Research, 55, 553–560.
Eastwood, J. (1994). Oxford guide to English grammar. Oxford University Press.
Emirbayer, M. (1997). Manifesto for a relational sociology. American Journal of Sociology,
103(2), 281-317.
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management
Review, 14(4), 532-550.
Feldman, M., & Orlikowski, W. (2011). Theorizing practice and practicing theory.
Organization Science, 22, 1240-1253.
Fisher, G., & Aguinis, H. (2017). Using theory elaboration to make theoretical advancements,
Organizational Research Methods, 20(3), 438-464.
Gibson, J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Houghton Mifflin.
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. Outline of the theory of structuration. Polity
Press.
Gioia, D., Corley, K., & Hamilton, A. (2013). Seeking qualitative rigor in inductive research:
Notes on the Gioia methodology. Organizational Research Methods, 16(1), 15-31.
Glaser, B. (1978). Theoretical sensitivity: Advances in the methodology of grounded theory.
Sociology Press.
Glaser, B. (2002). Conceptualization: On theory and theorizing using grounded theory.
International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 1(2).
Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory. Aldine.
Goertz, G., & Mahoney, J. (2012). Concepts and measurement: Ontology and epistemology.
Social Science Information, 51(2), 205–216.
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Doubleday Anchor.
Goldkuhl, G. (2002). Anchoring scientific abstractions – ontological and linguistic
determination following socio-instrumental pragmatism. Proceedings of European
Conference on Research Methods in Business.
Goldkuhl, G. (2005). Socio-instrumental pragmatism: A theoretical synthesis for pragmatic
conceptualisation in information systems. Proceedings of ALOIS-2005.
Goldkuhl, G. (2011). The research practice of practice research: Theorizing and situational
inquiry. Systems, Signs & Actions, 5(1), 7-29.
Goldkuhl, G. (2012). Pragmatism vs. interpretivism in qualitative information systems
research. European Journal of Information Systems, 21(2), 135-146.
Goldkuhl, G. (2019). The generation of qualitative data in information systems research: the
diversity of empirical research methods. Communications of AIS, 44, Article 28.
Goldkuhl, G. (2022). The subject matter of process automation practices: Through the lenses
of research questions. In G. Juell-Skielse, I. Lindgren, & M. Åkesson (Eds.), Service
automation in the public sector: Concepts, empirical examples and challenges (pp. 1333). Springer.
Goldkuhl, G., & Cronholm, S. (2019). Grounded theory in information systems research – from
themes in IS discourse to possible developments. Proceedings of ICIS-2019.
Goldkuhl, G., & Röstlinger, A. (2003). Towards an integral understanding of organisations and
information systems: Convergence of three theories. In H. Gazendam, R Jorna, & R.

Göran Goldkuhl

2741

Cijsouw (Eds.), Dynamics and change in organizations: Studies in organizational
semiotics (pp. 133-161). Kluwer.
Grönroos, C. (2017). On value and value creation in service: A management perspective.
Journal of Creating Value, 3(2), 125–141.
Hirsch, P., & Levin, D. (1999). Umbrella advocates versus validity police: A life-cycle model.
Organization Science, 10(2), 199-212
James, W. (1907). Pragmatism. A new name for some old ways of thinking. Longmans, Green
& Co.
Kennedy, B., & Thornberg, R. (2018). Deduction, induction, and abduction. In U. Flick (Ed.),
The SAGE handbook of qualitative data collection (pp. 49-64). SAGE.
King, B., Felin, T., & Whetten, D. (2010). Finding the organization in organizational theory:
A meta-theory of the organization as a social actor. Organization Science, 21(1), 290305.
Kolb, D. (1984). Experiential learning. Experience as the source of learning and development.
Prentice-Hall.
Langley, A. (1999). Strategies for theorizing from process data. Academy of Management
Review, 24(4), 691-710.
Locke, E. (2012). Construct validity vs. concept validity. Human Resource Management
Review, 22, 146–148.
Locke, K., & Golden-Biddle, K. (1997). Constructing opportunities for contribution:
Structuring intertextual coherence and ‘problematizing’ in organizational studies.
Academy of Management Journal, 40, 1023–1062.
Mead, G. H. (1938). Philosophy of the act. University of Chicago Press.
Miettinen, R., Samra-Fredericks, D., & Yanow, D. (2009). Re-turn to practice: An introductory
essay. Organization Studies, 30(12), 1309–1327.
Nicolini, D. (2012). Practice theory, work, & organization. Oxford University Press.
Ogden, C. K., & Richards, I. A. (1923). The meaning of meaning. A study of the influence of
language upon thought and of the science of symbolism. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Orlikowski, W., & Baroudi, J. (1991). Studying information technology in organizations:
Research approaches and assumptions. Information Systems Research, 2(1), 1-28.
Osigweh, C. (1989). Concept fallibility in organizational science. Academy of Management
Review, 14(4), 579-594.
Peirce, C. S. (1878). How to make our ideas clear. Popular Science Monthly, 12, 286-302.
Podsakoff, P., MacKenzie, S., & Podsakoff, N. (2016). Recommendations for creating better
concept definitions in the organizational, behavioral, and social sciences.
Organizational Research Methods, 19(2), 159-203.
Reckwitz, A. (2002). Toward a theory of social practices. A development in culturalist
theorizing. European Journal of Social Theory, 5(2), 243–263.
Rescher, N. (1996). Process metaphysics. An introduction to process philosophy. SUNY Press.
Reynolds, P. D. (1971). A primer in theory construction. Bobbs-Merril.
Rorty, R. (2010). Wittgenstein and the linguistic turn. In A. Ahmed (Ed.), Wittgenstein’s
philosophical investigations: A critical guide (pp. 129–144). Cambridge University
Press.
Saldaña, J. (2016). The coding manual for qualitative researchers (3rd ed.). SAGE.
Schatzki, T. (1996). Social practices. A Wittgensteinian approach to human activity and the
social. Cambridge University Press.
Schatzki, T. (2001). Introduction: Practice theory. In T. Schatzki, K. Knorr Cetina, & E. von
Savigny (Eds.), The practice turn in contemporary theory (pp. 1-14). Routledge.
Schein, E. (2001). Clinical inquiry/research. In P. Reason & H. Bradbury (Eds.), Handbook of
action research (pp. 266-279). SAGE.

2742

The Qualitative Report 2022

Schmidt, K. (2014). The concept of ‘practice’: What’s the point? COOP 2014 - Proceedings
of the 11th international conference on the design of cooperative systems (pp. 427–
444). Nice, France. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06498-7_26
Schoeneborn, D., Kuhn, T., & Kärreman, D. (2019). The communicative constitution of
organization, organizing, and organizationality. Organization Studies, 40(4), 475–496.
Scott, J. (1990). A matter of record. Documentary sources in social research. Polity Press.
Scott, W. (2014). Institutions and organizations (4th ed.). SAGE.
Simpson, B. (2009). Pragmatism, Mead and the practice turn. Organization Studies, 30(12),
1329–1347.
Spradley, J. (1979). The ethnographic interview. Waveland Press.
Strauss, A. (1987). Qualitative analysis for social scientists. Cambridge University Press.
Suddaby, R. (2010). Construct clarity in theories of management and organization. Academy
of Management Review, 35(3), 346–357
Sutton, R., & Staw, B. (1995). What theory is not. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 371384.
Taylor, J., & Van Every, E. (2000). The emergent organization. Communication at its site and
surface. Lawrence Erlbaum.
Thayer, H. S. (1981). Meaning and action. A critical history of pragmatism. Hackett
Publishing.
Thornberg, R., & Dunne C. (2019). Literature review in grounded theory. In A. Bryant & K.
Charmaz (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of current developments in grounded theory (2nd
ed., pp. 206-221) SAGE.
Tsoukas, H. (2000). False dilemmas in organization theory: Realism or social constructivism?
Organization, 7(3), 531-535.
Van Maanen, J., Sørensen, J., & Mitchell, T. (2007). The interplay between theory and method,
Academy of Management Review, 32(4), 1145–1154.
Vargo, S., & Lusch, R. (2008). Service-dominant logic: Continuing the evolution. Journal of
the Academy of Marketing Science, 36(1), 1–10.
Webster, J., & Watson, R. (2002). Analyzing the past to prepare for the future: Writing a
literature review, MIS Quarterly, 26(2), xiii-xxiii.
Weick, K. (1979). The social psychology of organizing (2nd ed.). McGraw-Hill.
Welch, C., Rumyantseva, M., & Hewerdine, L. (2016). Using case research to reconstruct
concepts: A methodology and illustration. Organizational Research Methods, 19(1),
111-130.
Wertsch, J. (1998). Mind as action. Oxford University Press.
Whetten, D. (1989). What constitutes a theoretical contribution? Academy of Management
Review, 14(4), 490-495.
Whittington, R. (2006). Completing the practice turn in strategy research. Organization
Studies, 27(5), 613–634.
Wittgenstein, L. (1958a). Philosophical investigations. Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1958b). The blue and brown books. Preliminary studies for the
“Philosophical investigations”. Basil Blackwell.
Wolfswinkel, J., Furtmueller, E., & Wilderom, C. (2013). Using grounded theory as a method
for rigorously reviewing literature. European Journal of Information Systems, 22, 45–
55.
Yuan, Y.-H., & Wu, C. (2008). Relationships among experiential marketing, experiential
value, and customer satisfaction. Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research, 32(3),
387-410.

Göran Goldkuhl

2743

Author Note
Göran Goldkuhl, Ph.D., is a professor of information systems at Linköping University
(Sweden). He holds an honorary doctorate from Örebro University. His research interests cover
areas such as qualitative and pragmatist research methodologies, practice research and practice
theorizing, action research, case study methodology, design science, innovation and change
management, work and IT codesign, business process modeling, communication analysis,
digital service design, IS evaluation, e-government. He has published in journals such as
Australasian Journal of Information Systems, Business Process Management Journal,
Communications of ACM, Communications of AIS, Electronic Journal of Business Research
Methods, European Journal of Information Systems, Government Information Quarterly,
Information and Organization, Information Systems and e-Business Management,
International Journal of Qualitative Methods, Journal of AIS, Scandinavian Journal of
Information Systems, Semiotica, Transforming Government. Please direct correspondence to
goran.goldkuhl@liu.se.
Copyright 2022: Göran Goldkuhl and Nova Southeastern University.
Article Citation
Goldkuhl, G. (2022). Linguistic and ontological concept formation: The LION method. The
Qualitative Report, 27(12), 2715-2743. https://doi.org/10.46743/2160-3715/2022.5633

